In order to assure Quality of Service (QoS) connectivity, Network Service Providers (NSPs) negotiate Service Level Agreements (SLAs). However, a committed SLA might fail to respect its QoS promises. In such a case, the customer is refunded. To maximize their revenues, the NSPs must deal with risks of SLA violations, which are correlated to their network capacities. Due to the complexity of the problem, we first study a system with one NSP provider and give a method to compute its risk-aware optimal strategy using (max, +)-algebras. Using the same method, we study the case where two NSPs collaborate and the case where they compete, and we derive the Price of Anarchy. This method provides optimal negotiation strategies but, when modeling customers' reaction to SLA failure, analytical results do not hold. Hence, we propose a learning framework that chooses the NSP risk-aware optimal strategy under failures capturing the impact of reputation. Finally, by simulation, we observe how the NSP can benefit from such a framework.
INTRODUCTION
Internet actors, and in particular Network Service Providers (NSPs), are facing an increasingly network resource demand from Content Service Providers (CSPs) and end-users. Current Internet applications (e.g. video streaming, gaming, telepresence, etc.) impose more and more constraints on the networks, such as high bandwidth, low delay and packet-loss, etc. Guarantees on such parameters are defined as Quality of Service (QoS) guarantees. Service Level Agreements (SLAs) comprise such guarantees (bandwidth, delay, etc.) and charging conditions (price, penalties, etc.). They are bilaterally negotiated between a customer (which can be a company, a CSP or another NSP) and a provider (an NSP).
Upon the reception of a customer's request, an NSP faces then several issues: first, it must identify whether its network resources can sustain or not the required QoS. And second, it has to provide a price that will allow it to be selected by the customer. Solving these issues is particularly challenging since: i) the NSP has no information on the proposal of its competitors, ii) the customer might demand a QoS that places too many constraints on its resources, forbidding further resources with higher willingness to pay, iii) the NSP has no information on the customer behavior: his willingness-to-pay, his QoS sensitivity (some customer might prefer to be upgraded if the cost difference is not so high), his possible preferences among providers (i.e customer's sensitivity to the NSP reputation) and his request arrival law. Furthermore, the NSP proposal (and how its commitment on the SLA is achieved if it is chosen) will impact both its network resources and the customer behavior.
A committed and provisioned SLA can fail, i.e., its QoS guarantees are violated. Such a violation leads to a loss of revenues and negatively impacts the reputation of the NSP. Each NSP having a limited capacity, the more its capacity is used, the higher is the failure probability. Thus, when provisioning the resources for an SLA, the NSP should be aware of the impact of the provisioned capacity on the failure probability. As the SLAs are provisioned for a given time period, the service duration affects the network capacity. The goal of an NSP is thus to find the optimal trade-off (also called negotiation strategy) between selling too few SLAs (and thus keeping a good reputation but gathering little revenues) and selling too many SLAs (and thus gathering more immediate rewards but decreasing its reputation -which leads to decreasing its long term revenues). Having a system that computes optimal negotiation strategies can thus bring a highly competitive advantage to NSPs. Considering the analysis of the SLA negotiation, several works ( [1, 2, 3, 4] ) focused on the same parameters influencing the customer's choice: sensitivity to the QoS parameters and price, proposals from competitor NSPs. Very few works considered the influence of the failure and the reputation on the customer's choice. In a previous work [5] , we introduced a simple model of reputation and argued how the NSPs should take into account the customer's reputation sensitivity.
In [5] , the introduced model did not capture the impact of the time-period during which an SLA is provisioned. Such time constraints add a complexity dimension to the riskaware SLA negotiation problem. In this paper, to illustrate the complexity of the problem, we first study a system of one customer and one NSP. We give a method to compute the optimal strategy of the NSP using (max, +)-algebra tools. We then study a system of one customer and two NSPs without reputation (as illustrated by Fig. 1 ) and provide a method to compute the optimal strategy when the NSPs collaborate and when they are selfish, and we discuss the Price of Anarchy in such a system. When introducing the reputation, the system becomes too complex to be analytically studied. Furthermore, the failure probability and its impact on the reputation of the NSP are not known in practice. Thus, we opt for a framework of learning algorithms applied to the SLA negotiation problem with reputation and time-period reservation and perform simulations to assess the ability of these algorithms to learn risk-aware strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the SLA negotiation problem and summarizes some related works. Section 3 describes the model of the system. Section 4 describes a method to compute the optimal strategy of one NSP when facing the requests of one customer. Section 5 studies a system comprising one customer and two NSPs (if they collaborate and if they are selfish). Section 6 introduces a reputation mechanism and describes how it impacts the NSP optimal strategy. Section 7 describes the learning framework extended to support reputation and service duration. Finally, section 8 presents the simulation results obtained with the learning algorithms.
LONG TERM PROVISIONING AND RE-LATED WORK
In the studied scenario, depicted by Fig. 1 , the NSPs compete for the customer's selection through SLA offers. 
SLA negotiation
As in several frameworks [6, 2] , the customer first sends a request specifying required QoS parameters (e.g. bandwidth > 10Gbps and delay < 10ms) to its neighbor NSPs. Each NSP then sends an offer to the customer. This offer can satisfy or exceed the QoS parameters requited by the customer. Each NSP also sends a price corresponding to its offer. Finally the customer selects one offer which will be instantiated by the provider NSP. The NSPs compete on QoS parameters and prices in order to be selected by the customer. We assume in this paper that the SLAs have the same duration, and that each NSP receives a single request at each time. However, since the SLA duration exceeds one time unit, the provisioned SLAs of the same NSP can overlap. Fig. 1 illustrates two NSPs (each one having 3 SLAs) in competition to be selected by a customer.
The NSP is facing two important challenges: i) which SLA the NSP would offer in order to be selected by the customer, ii) how to minimize the failure probability and keep a good reputation. Achieving these challenges is difficult for several reasons: the NSP has no information on the customer's profile (customer's sensitivity to the QoS, to the price, to the reputation, etc.). The NSP has no information on the offers of the other NSPs, neither their SLA violation probability. It is not able to anticipate the future requests and its future network state (future used capacity, reputation, etc.). The purpose of our approach is to provide an algorithm that, avoiding the use of forecasting method, will embed observation from both customer behavior and network state to recommend an SLA offer to propose.
Related work
The SLA negotiation problem and risk-aware provisioning are generally separately considered. In [2] , the authors propose a Reinforcement Learning framework to perform SLA negotiation and insure end-to-end QoS guarantees. The authors of [7] analyze the SLA negotiation problem in a game theoretic perspective. They specify the strategies that allow to reach an equilibrium. In a previous work [3] , we presented a framework of Reinforcement Learning algorithms applied to the SLA negotiation problem and compared their performances in simulation results.
Considering the risk-aware provisioning problem, the authors of [8] propose a provisioning scheme which minimizes the SLA violation risk and allows a minimum risk path selection in WDM 1 networks. The authors argue that taking into account the statistical availability of a path is not sufficient to minimize the violation risk. They propose to take into account more accurate parameters (such as failure profile, availability target, etc.) in the path computation scheme. Other works [9, 10] focus on management risk mechanisms to assure QoS guarantees in Grid Systems.
These works do not make a relation between the SLA negotiation (competing to be selected by the customer) and long term and risk-aware provisioning (which provisioning strategy adopt in order to keep a low failure probability). A way to connect these two problems is to introduce a reputation mechanism (over the NSPs) which is dependent upon the NSP failure rate (i.e., SLA violation rate) and to consider that the customer is sensitive to the reputation. In a previous work [5] , we provide such a mechanism and present simulation results showing that Reinforcement Learning algorithms can learn strategies that keep good reputation. However, the temporal aspects of the SLA negotiation (SLA duration, SLA overlapping and its impact on the future available resources, etc.) were not considered. These aspects complicate the problem of long-term provisioning.
In this work, we first study the case where the SLAs have the same (fixed) duration and arrive at regular intervals. We provide a method to compute the NSP optimal strategy when there is one NSP, and then when there are two NSPs. In the latter case, we also compute the optimal strategy when the NSPs are selfish and derive the Price of Anarchy. In the second part of this work, we introduce a reputation mechanism and a learning framework to perform SLA negotiations with reputation.
RISK-AWARE SLA NEGOTIATION MODEL 3.1 NSP characteristics
Each NSP has a fixed maximum capacity denoted by cmax. Let ct be the NSP capacity used between decision epoch t − 1 and decision epoch t. We define the used capacity rate at decision epoch t as ρt = ct/cmax and the average used capacity rate (during some period T ) asρ = ( 
The Failure function
The probability of failure of an SLA depends on the used capacity rate of the NSP. As a function of the used capacity rate, it is denoted by f (ρt). The failure probability can be for example f (ρt) = ρt, f (ρt) = ρ 2 t or f (ρt) = 1 − exp(−ρt).
1 Wavelength Division Multiplexing.
NSP reward
An NSP get a reward at each decision epoch. The reward obtained at decision epoch t is denoted by vt. If ct is NSP used capacity at decision epoch t then:
Thus, the expected reward at decision epoch t is E(vt) = pu · cmax · ρt · (1 − f (ρt)) .
Customer's characteristics
In order to compare the customer's sensitivity to the QoS parameters and to the price, the QoS parameters are regrouped within a normalized measure in [0, 1).
Quality of Service measure
A measure || · || on the QoS provided by an SLA is computed according to its parameters. It is defined as:
where breq is the minimum bandwidth requested by the customer, dreq the maximum delay and req the maximum packetloss. When q j i complies with the QoS requirements, then ||q i || ∈ [0, 1). The function ||.|| tends to 1 when the values of QoS parameters of the SLA surpass the customer's requirements. The SLAs that do not comply with the customer's requirements are not considered.
Customer's utility according to an SLA
We opted for the classical customer's utility (Quality of Service − price):
where η is a fixed parameter, p j i is the price of q j i , and pmax is the maximum price the customer is willing to pay.
ONE NSP WITHOUT COMPETITION
Here we study the problem where there is only one NSP (called NSP 1) and one customer. The SLAs are simply denoted by q j and their parameters by b j , d j and j .
The NSP states
In order to select the SLA that maximizes its average reward, NSP 1 needs a complete information on its current and future available capacity. At each decision epoch t, NSP 1 knows which SLAs it provisioned until decision epoch t.
While the SLAs provisioned before decision epoch t − ∆ are already released, those provisioned between decision epochs t − ∆ and t are still using the NSP capacity. Thus, these SLAs allow to know how much capacity will be released at each decision epoch between t and t + ∆.
Thus, we define the state of NSP1 at decision epoch t as the ordered list of SLAs That will be released between t and t + ∆. In fact, the NSP only needs to know their bandwidth. Thus, we define more formally the state of NSP1 at decision epoch t as a vector st = (b 1 , . . . , b ∆ ) where b j is the bandwidth of the SLA that will be released at decision epoch t + j. Thus, the used capacity at decision epoch t is
It is clear that if NSP 1 total capacity cmax is unbounded then the total number of possible states of NSP 1 is (|Q| + 1)
j > cmax are not valid (we mean by not valid that these states require to use a capacity greater than the total capacity of NSP 1. Thus, they cannot be reached). Let S1 be the set of valid states of NSP 1. Then:
where
Example 1 2 ) is a state where q 1 will be released at t + 1 and q 2 will be released at t + 2. In this example, |S1| = (|Q1| + 1) ∆ = (2 + 1) 2 = 9. All the states are reachable.
Remark 2. Example 1.1, as the other examples in this paper, are obviously not realistic. Their purpose is to illustrates the approaches and the methods used in this paper rather than to provide realistic data. In a concrete case, the SLAs are more fine-grained (mainly less than 5% of the NSP capacity) and have a longer duration. Such examples are not convenient to explain the methods described here because the number of states may be huge and can not be described clearly and concisely in a paper format. In Section 8, we use more realistic data to perform simulations.
Maximizing the average reward
At each decision epoch t, NSP 1 receives a request from the customer, then selects an SLA and offers it to the customer. NSP 1 may also offer nothing. The customer accepts the offer (because it is the only one). In this case the offered SLA is provisioned. If NSP 1 does not make an offer, it only releases the SLA provisioned at t − ∆ (if it exists).
As a consequence, the transition from the state st to the state st+1 is done by releasing the SLA provisioned at t − ∆ (if it exists) and provisioning the SLA offered at time t (if it exists). The expected reward for NSP 1 is then vt+1
Define the transition function T1 : S1×S1 → R as T1(s i , s j ) = vj · (1 − f (ρj)) for any possible transtion from s i to s j and T1(s i , s j ) = −∞ if the transition from s i to s j is not possible.
Let Xt(s i ) be the optimal reward after t steps starting from state s i . It can be computed by induction, using the linearity of the expectation, as: X0(s i ) = 0 for all s i ∈ S1 and
Equation (1) is linear in term of (max, +)-algebras: see T1 as a square matrix and Xt as a column vector of size |S1|. Then we can write:
and more generally,
where for any matrices A and B, any vector X,
More details about (max, +)-algebras can be found in [11] . Now, the mean optimal reward is:
This value exists and can easily be computed using the spectral theorem of (max, +) matrices [11] . In our setting, T1 is an irreducible (its graph is strongly connected) and aperiodic (T1(s 0 , s 0 ) = −∞) matrix, so there exist λ ∈ R and T ∈ R+ such that for all t ≥ T , T t+1 1 = λ + T t 1 . Then λ is the desired value E(vmax), which can be computed as the average weight of a cycle of maximum average weight:
Formula (2) suggests a naive algorithm to compute E(vmax) in time O(|S1| 4 ). However, using Karp's algorithm [12] reduces the time complexity to O(|S1| 3 ) in the worst case.
As a consequence, NSP 1 will follow one of the cycle with maximum average weight in order to maximize its rewards.
Example 1.2
This example shows the graph of states and transitions of an NSP and the maximum average weight cycle which maximizes the NSP rewards. Let NSP 1 has the same SLAs as in Example 1.1. Thus, its set of strategies is {q 1 , q 2 }. Let the failure function be f (ρ) = ρ, ρ ∈ [0, 1] (the failure probability is linear w.r.t. the used capacity rate). And let the unit price be pu = 1 monetary unit (m. u.) per Gbps. Fig. 3 shows the set of states and the transitions associated to the NSP. The transitions are valuated by the expected reward when reaching the new state. The maximum average cycle is given by s 3 , s 4 , s 3 . . . The maximum average reward is 25 and the optimal used capacity rate is ρopt = 50%.
Another approach to compute the maximum average reward
Suppose that NSP 1 can set its average used capacity ratẽ ρ =c/cmax (wherec is the average used capacity) to any value in [0, 1]. And suppose that it knows the value of the failure function f (ρ) for allρ ∈ [0, 1]. The NSP reward, as defined in Section 3.1.3, depends on the bandwidth of the provisioned SLAs.
Thus, the average reward per time unit is given by v(1−f (ρ)) and NSP 1 goal is to compute the optimal average reward, which is ρopt = arg maxρ
If NSP 1 knows the values of f (ρ) and v for allρ ∈ [0, 1], then it is easy to compute the optimal average used capacity that maximizes the average reward. This approach is useful if the SLAs are fine-grained, which allows to closely approximate ρopt by ( 
TWO NSPS AND ONE CUSTOMER
In this section we focus on the SLA negotiation problem when there are two NSPs (called NSP 1 and NSP 2) and one customer
Optimal strategy when the NSPs collaborate
Here both NSPs are considered as a single one and the goal is to maximize the sum of their rewards. The approach to compute the optimal reward and the optimal strategies is the same as in Section 4.2.
Let S1 (resp. S2) be the set of reachable states of NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2) as defined in Section 4.1. And let T1 (resp. T2) be the transition function of NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2) as defined in Section 4.2. For each state s The set of states S of the whole system is included the Cartesian product S1 × S2. If s = (s1, s2) ∈ S1 × S2 and s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S1 × S2 then there is a transition from s to s iff at least one of those three cases occurs:
1. There is a transition from s1 to s 1 and s 2 = suc ∅ (s2) 2. there is a transition from s2 to s 2 and s 1 = suc ∅ (s1) 3. s 1 = suc ∅ (s1) and s 2 = suc ∅ (s2).
Note that case 3. is redundant, as (si, suc ∅ (si)) is always a transition of Ti. The state space S is exactly the states in the strongly connected component to whom belongs the state ((0, . . . , 0), (0, . . . , 0)) in the transition function T .
Moreover, the transition function T over S is defined as:
Similarly to what has been done in Section 4.2, the maximum average reward of the whole system is given by:
) be the maximum average reward of NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2) in case of one NSP, one customer. Then: The right inequality is a direct consequence of the fact that S ⊆ S1 × S2 and Equation (3): from each cycle of T one can find two cycles (a) with the same length respectively in T1 and T2, (b) whose weight is the sum of the weights of those two cycles. As a consequence, the mean weight of this cycle in T is the sum of the mean weight of a cycle in T1 and of a cycle in T2.
Optimal strategy when the NSPs are selfish
There are two possible cases when the NSPs are selfish. First, each NSP has a dominant strategy, i.e., for each NSP, there is an SLA that maximizes its expected average reward, regardless of the NSP used capacity rate or the NSP state. Second, one NSP (or both NSPs) has no dominant strategy. These two cases lead to a slightly different models but do not impact the results.
Dominant Strategy
We assume here that each NSP has a dominant strategy corresponding to offer one SLA. If such an SLA exists, then it is clearly the one that maximizes the customer's utility. Thus, offering this SLA at each decision epoch is a dominant strategy for both NSPs. Let q * 1 (resp. q * 2 ) be this SLA for NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2). The configuration where each NSP i offers q * i is a Nash equilibrium of the game [13] 2 .
If the utility of the customer when accepting q * 1 (resp. q * 2 ) is greater than its utility when accepting q * 2 (resp q * 1 ), the customer will always select the offer of NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2). In this case, the dominant NSP will monopolize the market.
If the customer's utility is the same for q * 1 and q * 2 , we assume that the customer selects randomly (with probability 1/2) between q * 1 and q * 2 . The different states of the system and the transitions between them can be modeled as a Markov chain. A state of the Markov chain is a pair [s1, s2] where s1 ∈ S1 and s2 ∈ S2. Let suc ∅ (si) be the successor of si as defined in Section 5. A configuration where each player plays its dominant strategy is always a Nash equilibrium [14] . selects surely one of them. It follows that the number of recurrent states of the Markov chain is 2 ∆ .
There is a transition (with probability 1/2) from state s = [s1, s2] to s = [s 1 , s 2 ] iff:
note that the Price of Anarchy can be arbitrary large depending on the price difference between the Nash equilibrium strategy SLA (q * i ) and the optimal SLAs that maximize the NSP reward if there is only one NSP. Example 2 provides an instance where the Price of Anarchy is larger than 1.
Example 2. In this example, we assume that NSP 1 and NSP 2 have the same maximal capacity cmax = 100Gbps and the same set of SLAs: q 1 with bandwidth b 1 = 30Gbps= 30% · cmax and q 2 with bandwidth b 2 = 50Gbps= 50% · cmax. The duration of all SLAs is ∆ = 2 units of time and the failure function is f (ρ) = ρ. Suppose that the request of the customer is such that the customer's utility is maximized by q 1 . Thus, offering q 1 is a dominant strategy for both NSPs and the situation where both NSP 1 and NSP 2 offer q 1 is a Nash equilibrium. If the used capacity of an NSP is either ct = 0 or ct = 30% · cmax, offering q 1 instead of nothing increases its expected reward (the NSP expected reward when its used capacity is at ct = 60% · cmax are greater than its expected reward when its used capacity is at ct = 30% · cmax). We assume that when both NSPs offer the same SLA, then the customer selects randomly one of them with probability 1/2.
It is clear that the optimal strategy for both NSPs is to offer alternatively q 2 and nothing (NSP 1 offers q 2 at decision epoch t = 0 then NSP 2 offers q 2 at t = 2, etc.). The expected average reward for each NSP is then E(vmax) = 25 m.u. per decision epoch.
Computing the expected average reward in the situation of Nash equilibrium described above can be done as follows: Since both NSPs offer q 1 at each decision epoch, and since the customer selects randomly one of them at each decision epoch, the states of the system can be modeled as a Markov chain. Fig. 4 shows the Markov chain associated to the system when both NSPs play their Nash equilibrium strategy. The states are combinations of two single NSP states and the arrows represent the transitions between the states. Each transition is shown with its probability. The recurrent states are those in the dotted rectangle. The transition matrix of the reduced Markov chain is given by: the expected average reward of each NSP is:
Thus, the Price of Anarchy in this case is 25/16.5 ≈ 1.51.
Proposition 2. The Price of Anarchy can be arbitrary large depending on the SLAs of the NSPs.
Sketch of proof.
As shown in Example 2, the Nash equilibrium strategy of the NSPs can differ from the optimal strategy if they collaborate. It is easy to design a game where the revenues gathered by the optimal strategy are arbitrary larger than the revenues gathered by the Nash equilibrium strategy. For instance, it is sufficient to consider the same parameters as in Example 2 and to set the bandwidth of q 1 as small as wanted. This gives a Price of anarchy as large as wanted.
Absence of dominant strategy
Depending on its state, an NSP may proposes nothing instead of the closest SLA to the customer's request (for example, when the NSP has a too high used capacity). This case slightly impacts the structure of the Markov chain as described in Section 5.2.1 because it allows that both NSPs offer nothing to the customer. This leads to having transitions from a state s = [s1, s2] to s = [s 1 , s 2 ] where s 1 = suc ∅ (s1) and s 2 = suc ∅ (s2). However, the approach to compute the equilibrium expected reward remains the same. In this case too, it is possible to have instances where the Price of Anarchy is unbounded.
COMPETITION WITH REPUTATION MECHANISM
All the results stated in the previous sections are based on the assumption that the customers are only sensitive to the QoS parameters and the price of the SLAs. However, the customer is also sensitive to past failures he experimented with the NSP, modeled as its NSP reputation. Unfortunately, with a dynamic reputation (evolving during time), the Markov chain defined in section 5 is non-homogeneous. Section 6.2 explains this non-homogeneity thus motivating an evaluation by simulation.
We assume that all the customers are aware of the NSP reputation. We do not address the reputation propagation mechanism among the customers. The interested reader can refer to chapters 23 and 27 of [15] for an overview of reputation systems.
Computing the reputation value
We simply consider the reputation of an NSP as the (statistical) probability of success of its provisioned SLAs:
where #f ail(i) is the number of SLAs provisioned by NSP i that were violated and #select(i) is the total number of SLAs provisioned 3 by NSP i.
Customer's choice regarding the NSP reputation
The reputation of an NSP can be seen as a probability of success of the SLA it offers. Thus, the utility of the customer according to an offer can be weighted by its reputation. More formally:
where q * 1 (resp. q * 2 ) is the SLA proposed by NSP 1 (resp. NSP 2). The same formula applies for NSP 2 (by replacing q Thus, the transition probabilities between the states of the system are dependent upon the NSP reputation, which evolves at each decision epoch. This implies that the Markov chain associated to the system (as described in Section 5.2) is nonhomogeneous. Thus, it is difficult to obtain analytical results and to compute the optimal strategies that maximize the rewards of the NSPs. This motivates the use of learning algorithms as described in the following section.
LEARNING FRAMEWORK
This second part of this paper evaluates if learning algorithms can learn a strategy capturing both the network capacity state and the NSP reputation, and if they find a trade-off between gathering high revenues and keeping good reputation. In this section, we provide an extension of the learning framework of [3, 5] to support the time durations of SLAs which plays a key role on the network capacity state.
Learning algorithms
In this section, we propose an adaptation of two learning algorithms: the Linear Reward Inaction (LRI) and the QLearning. Learning algorithms follow a scheme of 3 primitives : select, observe, update. The select primitive applies the learning algorithm policy to determine an optimal strategy. The observe primitive is a phase where the algorithm waits and observes the environment response (defined by the reward) to its proposed strategy. The update primitive modifies the knowledge used to select the strategy according to the observed reward.
Linear Reward Inaction Algorithm
The LRI maintains a probability vector πt where each πt(j) is the probability to offer q j i at decision epoch t to the customer. If the action succeeds (i.e., the offered SLA is selected by the customer), then the probability vector is updated as follows:
where q j i is the selected SLA, q k i denotes all the other SLAs, vt is the reward at time t (the price of q j i ) and β is a learning parameter s.t. 0 < β < 1. Note that the LRI algorithm is stateless, it does not take into account the NSP state (remaining capacity, etc.) in the decision process.
Q-Learning Algorithm

Markov Decision Process
The Q-Learning algorithm performs on a Markov Decision Process (MDP) model. An MDP is formalized as a 4-tuple {S, A, P, R} where:
• S is the set of states of the MDP. The structure of a state is explained in the following section,
• A is the set of actions. It corresponds to the set of SLAs of the NSP,
• P (σ, j, σ ) is the probability to reach the state σ when being in the state σ and offering the SLA q j i ,
• R(σ, j, σ ) is the reward when reaching the state σ after being in the state σ and offering the SLA q 
Capacity grade and MDP states
The used capacity rate should be in the MDP states so that the Q-Learning algorithm can learn strategies taking into account the remaining capacity of the NSP. However, the used capacity rate should be discretized in order to avoid combinatorial explosion of the number of states. Thus, it is converted into capacity grade (denoted by G). An example of discretization can be seen in Table 1 . Recall that the failure probability of an SLA is correlated with the used capacity rate of the NSP. Table 1 shows the capacity grade corresponding to each interval of used capacity rate, and the associated failure probability. These values are those used to perform simulations in Section 8.
A state σ of the MDP is a pair (req, G) where req is a request profile and G the capacity grade of the NSP. If there is a single customer, then the request does not matter since we assume that a customer always sends the same requests. However, if there are more than one customer, then putting the request profile in the state allows the NSP to adapt its strategy depending on the customer profile. Table 1 : Relation between capacity grade, used capacity rate and SLA violation probability.
The Q-Learning algorithm
The Q-Learning [16] is a model-free algorithm, i.e., it does not need to know the transition probabilities of the MDP to perform. It is a useful propriety since the transition probabilities are dependent upon the customer's response, the failure probability and the other NSP offers. These values are not known by the NSP.
The Q-Learning algorithms compute the optimal Q-values of each pair (state, action) of the MDP at each decision epoch t. The Q-value of a pair (σ, a) at decision epoch t is defined as Qt(σ, a) = E[Rt | σt = σ, at = a] where Rt = ∞ k=0 γ k v t+k , with vt is the expected reward at decision epoch t and γ ∈ (0, 1] is a discount factor. Thus, Qt(σ, a) is the expected discounted reward when being in state σ and performing action a at decision epoch t.
The Q-Learning algorithm first initializes all the variable values, then, at each decision epoch, selects an SLA to offer according to some Q-based policy. The most common policy is the -greedy one. It consists, when being in state σ, to select the action a having the highest Q-value Qt(σ, a) with probability 1 − , and selecting another action at random with probability for some positive 1. After observing the customer's response (and thus getting vt and the new state σt+1), the Q-Learning algorithm updates the Q-values according to formula (4) , where αt is a learning rate initialized with a value in (0, 1), then decreased. 
Risk-aware Learning framework
The learning framework select, observe, update is particularly impacted when taking into account the fact that SLA violations might occur during a long time-period. This forces to shift the reward observation until the end of the SLA duration. Algorithm 2 shows the temporal learning framework as it is impacted by the temporal constraints. At a request arrival, the NSP selects an SLA according to some policy and observes the customer's choice. It provisions the SLA if it is chosen by the customer. Then it observes if a failure occurs (which is dependent upon its current resource state). In case of failure (i.e., SLA violation), it refunds all the customers whose SLAs are still provisioned. Otherwise it collects the SLA prices for decision epoch t. Finally, the SLAs provisioned at decision epoch t − ∆ (if any) are released and the learning data are updated.
SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to evaluate the behavior of learning algorithms (LRI and Q-Learning) and their ability to learn reputation-aware and risk-aware strategies, we perform simulations with two NSPs and one customer, then with two NSPs and two customers.
Simulated algorithms
The Q-Learning and LRI algorithms are compared to two "trivial" strategies:
• Min strategy: This strategy consists in offering always the cheapest SLA that satisfies the customer's requirements.
• Uniform strategy: It consists in offering at random and with uniform probability one of the SLAs that satisfy the customer's requirements.
Simulations with 1 customer and 2 NSPs
Simulation settings
We present the simulation results performed on the topology presented in Fig. 1 . Each NSP has a set of 4 SLAs as described in Table 2 . On table 2, SLAs are presented in an increasing price order.
The SLA duration ∆ = 40 time units and each NSP has a capacity of 10, 000Mbps. The customer request has the same QoS parameters as q Table 2 : Set of SLAs of NSP i (i = 1, 2).
30ms. Thus, all the SLAs satisfy the customer's requirements. Considering the learning parameters, we set β = 0.02 for the LRI algorithm and α0 = 0.5 and γ = 0.8 for the QLearning algorithm.
Each NSP uses a particular algorithm or strategy, denoted "Algo1 vs Algo2" on the figures; Algo1 is used by the NSP for which the results are exhibited by the curves, and Algo2 is the opponent NSP's strategy. QL stands for Q-Learning, Min for the Min strategy and Uniform for the Uniform strategy. When both NSPs use the same algorithm, it is simply denoted by"Algo" instead of "Algo1 vs Algo2".
Simulations were performed during 10000 rounds, where each round is repeated 100 times. All the results have been averaged according to the 100 repetitions.
Results
Fig . 5 shows the average reward per request of the first NSP when using different algorithms. . The results show that, after a short learning phase, the rewards stabilize, except those of the LRI algorithm which continue to slowly increase. The highest rewards are obtained when NSP 1 uses the LRI algorithm against the opponent NSP using the uniform strategy, followed by NSP 1 using Q-Learning algorithm against the opponent NSP using the uniform strategy. It seems that the min strategy performs bad against all other strategies, which means that the customer prefers to be upgraded with the current simulation parameters. The LRI algorithm perform slightly better than the Q-Learning algorithm, and the learning algorithms perform better than the trivial strategies. 6 shows the average reputation of NSP 1. Obviously, the min strategy keeps the highest reputation against all other strategies. Since the min strategy offers always the cheapest SLA (which is also the SLA with the lowest QoS parameters), it minimizes the NSP used capacity and thus minimizes also the SLA failure probability, which leads to a high reputation. All other strategies stabilize between a reputation of 0.8 and 0.9, which seems a good trade-off between a high reputation and high immediate rewards. Figure 6 : NSP reputation Fig. 7 shows the average used capacity of NSP 1. The more the capacity is used, the higher are the rewards. However, all the strategies maintain the used capacity between 20% and 45%, except the min strategy that maintains the used capacity less than 20%. 
Simulations with 2 customers and 2 NSPs
This section exhibits the simulation results with 2 customers and 2 NSPs. The setting parameters are the same as in Section 8.2.1, except that there are two customers sending their requests to both NSPs at the same time. The evolution of the reputation value in this case is not presented because it follows the same trend as in the case of 1 customer. Fig. 9 shows the evolution of the NSP used capacity. The correlation between the used capacity and the rewards can be seen in the same way that in the case of 1 customer. It seems that the Q-Learning algorithm performs Figure 9 : NSP used capacity worse than the LRI algorithm. In both cases of 1 and 2 customers, the LRI algorithm performs well. These results are inconsistent with those of [3] (where the Q-Learning algorithm performs better than the LRI algorithm). But, the problem addressed in [3] did not capture the NSP reputation, nor the multiple SLA overlapping and had a different customer preference function.
CONCLUSION
Assuring QoS connectivity is a major challenge for current and future networks. We investigated the optimal strategy of an NSP in the SLA negotiation taking into account the risk of SLA violations and we presented a method to compute such a strategy for 1 or 2 NSPs and one customer. Then, we defined a model for the NSP reputation embedding the SLA duration. As the previous results do not hold when introducing the reputation, we proposed a learning framework tackling this more complex problem. Simulations showed that learning algorithms outperform the strategies of offering the cheapest SLA or an SLA at random. Surprisingly, the LRI algorithm surpasses the Q-Learning algorithm. This may be due to the faster convergence of the LRI algorithm. As a future work, we plan to study algorithm performance under various arrival laws, and how these different laws impact the NSP optimal strategy.
